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Abstract 
In their daily lives, individuals continuously encounter situations where they disclose personal infor-
mation online. While individuals can largely benefit from personalized, convenient service offerings, 
many people are at the same time concerned about an invasion of their information privacy based on 
how organisations access and handle their data. Although we know that specific feared consequences 
shape our behaviour, little attention has been paid to which noticeable privacy risks can arise for in-
dividuals when their privacy is invaded. We differentiate between seven types of negative consequenc-
es that individuals perceive if their privacy is invaded, namely physical, social, resource-related, psy-
chological, prosecution-related, career-related, and freedom-related risks. In a comprehensive and 
rigorous scale development process, we validate scales for our multidimensional privacy risk con-
struct following the approach of MacKenzie et al. (2011). Based on several steps of qualitative and 
quantitative assessment, we demonstrate the reliability, validity, and usefulness of our measurement 
instrument. 
 
Keywords: Information Privacy, Privacy Risk, Scale Development, Measurement Instrument. 
1 Introduction 
Online services have become an integral part of our everyday lives. We shop online, we spend time in 
social networks, or use search engines to identify relevant information, to name just a few examples. 
In order to benefit from these convenient ways of buying, communicating, and gathering data, we of-
ten share personal data. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon can use the gained 
knowledge to improve and personalize their service offerings allowing them to even better address 
customer interests and needs and also to increase their profits. However, even though people seem to 
be willing to trade personal information for such benefits, at the same time, surveys continuously find 
that people are concerned about their privacy in today’s digital and data-driven economy (BCG, 2013; 
TRUSTe, 2013). Thus, the question arises how privacy perceptions influence people’s behaviour. 
Previous research has addressed this question by investigating how privacy concerns, defined as the 
worries that individuals have with respect to how their personal information is handled by others (e.g., 
see Hong and Thong, 2013; Smith et al., 1996), are associated with individuals’ behavioural reactions 
such as their information disclosure behaviour or their engagement in e-commerce (Smith et al., 
2011). Another stream of research relies on the construct of privacy risks. This construct is either de-
fined as opportunistic behaviour arising from other parties having access to an individual’s infor-
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mation (e.g., see Dinev and Hart, 2006; van Slyke et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2009) or as the beliefs of a 
high potential of loss which is associated with an individual’s information disclosure (e.g., see Dinev 
et al., 2013; Malhotra et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2015).  
We intend to offer a new perspective on how to investigate the influence of information privacy. In 
line with Dowling (1986), we argue that individuals only change their behaviour when they think they 
may be personally impacted by third party behaviour, or, in other words, when individuals believe that 
third party actions may result in noticeable negative consequences for themselves. However, the well-
established and frequently used conceptualisations of privacy concerns (Smith et al., 1996; Malhotra et 
al., 2004; Hong and Thong, 2013) and privacy risks (Malhotra et al., 2004; Dinev and Hart, 2006) do 
not explicitly cover this behaviourally relevant component. To give an example, unauthorized second-
ary use of personal information is one frequently used dimension of privacy concerns (e.g., see Hong 
and Thong, 2013; Junglas et al., 2008). The secondary use of personal data can steeply increase the 
value of a personalized information service as it can improve the underlying algorithms of the organi-
sation. Yet, we argue that only if individuals fear to be negatively affected by this secondary use of 
their information, they actually adapt their information disclosure behaviour accordingly. This is the 
case if they face specific risks such as a financial loss, a reputational damage, or being manipulated in 
their behaviour. Thus, the fear of specific risks likely has direct behavioural consequences, while mere 
concerns may or may not be attached to behavioural consequences.  
However, current conceptualisations of privacy risks are not connected to specific consequences. 
These conceptualisations only mention a general potential for losses when personal information is 
available to other parties (e.g., see Dinev et al., 2013; Malhotra et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2011; Xu et 
al., 2009; Yu et al., 2015), leaving unspecified what kind of losses they refer to. In such a case, the 
associated measurement instruments leave a wide range of interpretation and a uniform meaning can-
not be ensured (Converse and Presser, 1986; MacKenzie et al., 2011). For example, some individuals 
may think of losses in terms of financial losses while others associate them with losses of free choice 
due to tailored marketing efforts that influence them in their purchase behaviour. However, from 
“both practical and research standpoints, what cannot be measured cannot be managed” (Hille et al., 
2015, p.2). We are thus in need of a measurement instrument to empirically assess these different 
types of risks that individuals may perceive when disclosing information to services or other individu-
als. 
Based on these considerations, we pose the research question: What are suitable scales for a multi-
dimensional conceptualisation of privacy risks? The objective of this paper is therefore to systemati-
cally develop and validate such a scale. We also want to demonstrate the scale’s usefulness by as-
sessing it in a nomological network.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a short summary of related 
literature and the state-of-the-art in information privacy measurement instruments. Afterwards, we 
describe our scale development and validation process, which follows the guidelines and steps of 
MacKenzie et al. (2011). We therefore present our multi-dimensional privacy risk conceptualisation 
and the according scales, which we assess, refine, and validate with the help of a quantitative study. 
Finally, we discuss our results, provide theoretical and practical contributions, and offer avenues for 
future research. 
2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature  
Information privacy is a subset of privacy which privacy-related research in the information systems 
discipline concentrates on (Bélanger and Crossler, 2011). This focus can be explained by the interest 
of researchers in studying how information technologies and the advent of digital services change the 
influence individuals have over the gathering and use of their personal information. We rely on the 
well-established definition of information privacy as “an individual’s self-assessed state in which ex-
ternal [parties] have limited access to information about him or her” (Dinev et al., 2013, p.299). Fol-
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lowing Smith et al. (2011) and Dinev et al. (2013), the term “privacy” always refers to information 
privacy throughout this study. 
As privacy is hardly directly measurable, empirical research relies on privacy-related proxies and has 
consolidated over time on using privacy concerns and privacy risks as central constructs (Smith et al., 
2011). Two established operationalisations for privacy concerns exist. First, the ‘concern for infor-
mation privacy’ scale (Smith et al., 1996), which differentiates between four dimensions of privacy 
concerns, namely the concern that personal data is collected, is internally or externally used in an un-
authorized way, is improperly accessed, and is erroneous. Second, the ‘internet users’ information pri-
vacy concerns’ scale (Malhotra et al., 2004), which is conceptualised as “the degree to which an In-
ternet user is concerned about online marketers’ collection of personal information, the user’s control 
over the collected information, and the user’s awareness of how the collected information is used” 
(Malhotra et al., 2004, p.338). These two operationalisations have been consolidated and integrated by 
Hong and Thong (2013) into one measurement instrument. Overall, privacy concerns are conceptual-
ised to focus on how individuals perceive organisations to handle their data. The conceptualisations 
do, however, not focus on individuals’ perceptions of how these organisational practices may nega-
tively impact individuals, which is in the focus of our study. 
The conceptualisations of privacy risks can be broadly divided into two classes. First, privacy risks 
have been conceptualised as fears about other parties behaving opportunistically when they get access 
to an individual’s information (e.g., see Dinev and Hart, 2006; van Slyke et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2009). 
This conceptualisation is similar to the conceptualisations of privacy concerns and thus does also not 
focus on the negative consequences which may arise from such opportunistic behaviour of other par-
ties. Second, privacy risks have been defined as beliefs of a high potential of loss that may occur if an 
individual’s information is disclosed to other parties (e.g., see Dinev et al., 2013; Malhotra et al., 
2004; Smith et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2015). However, the related measurement instru-
ments measure people’s worries about a loss of privacy at a rather abstract level and remain unspecific 
what these losses actually refer to (e.g., see Dinev and Hart, 2006; Xu et al., 2010). Such conceptuali-
sations of a single-dimensional construct leave room for ambiguity and interpretation (Converse and 
Presser, 1986). They do not incorporate whether and how exactly the loss impacts people. These losses 
can occur in very different forms. For example, when shopping online, individuals face the risks of a 
financial loss if their credit card data is abused. In a social networking context, individuals might be 
more afraid of a reputational damage. Thus, the conceptualisations do not depict the complexity of 
risks which has been successfully exploited in other areas of research (Dowling, 1986). In marketing 
and e-commerce, for example, a detailed specification of the negative outcomes is a core element of 
risk (e.g., see Cunningham, 1967; Dowling, 1986; Glover and Benbasat, 2010; Jacoby and Kaplan, 
1972). Risks are mostly defined as being multi-dimensional, comprising performance, financial, so-
cial, physical, and psychological risks (Dowling, 1986).  
We believe that such a multi-dimensional conceptualisation is also necessary to fully capture the na-
ture of privacy risks. The aforementioned risk dimensions from other research areas are a first indica-
tion of possible dimensions, but they need to be adapted and extended to align with the unique context 
of information privacy. Privacy risks do not refer to product quality or online transactions. Instead, the 
perceived consequences of information misuse and their likelihood of occurrence are at centre stage. 
One first step towards a systematic and comprehensive conceptualisation of privacy risks which co-
vers different risk dimensions is provided by Karwatzki et al. (2017). Based on an extensive qualita-
tive study, they identified seven dimensions that describe how privacy-invasive practices such as data 
collection, improper access, or unauthorized usage might affect individuals physically, socially, re-
source-related, psychologically, prosecution-related, career-related, and freedom-related. As these di-
mensions cover the perceived negative consequences that individuals associate with others having ac-
cess to their information, they can serve as a starting point for our scale development process of multi-
dimensional privacy risks.  
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3 Scale Development  
Our research aims at developing scales for privacy risks taking into account the different dimensions 
of risk. We followed the approach of MacKenzie et al. (2011) to generate, validate, and refine our 
items. The approach comprises five steps: (1) developing a conceptual definition of the latent varia-
bles, (2) generating items that represent the latent variables and qualitatively assessing the content va-
lidity of the items, (3) formally specifying the measurement model, (4) evaluating the scales in a pre-
test and refining them, and (5) validating the final measurement model. The process with the essential 
activities and outcomes is depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Scale Development Process (adapted from MacKenzie et al. (2011)) 
3.1 Step 1: Conceptualisation 
For conceptualising privacy risks, we draw from existing literature on risks in other contexts (e.g., 
Featherman and Pavlou, 2003; Glover and Benbasat, 2010; Luo et al., 2010). Risks have been com-
monly defined as consisting of two components: (1) the severity of adverse consequences of a situa-
tion and (2) their probability of occurrence (Cunningham, 1967; Jacoby and Kaplan, 1972; Dowling, 
1986; Mitchell, 1999). To contextualize this general risk definition to the privacy area, we extend the 
conceptualisation of perceived adverse consequences of privacy-invasive practices by Karwatzki et al. 
(2017) which already captures the severity of negative outcomes that may arise if others have access to 
individuals’ information. We add the probability of occurrence and thus define privacy risks as the 
extent to which an individual believes that negative outcomes may arise from others’ access to his or 
her personal information. This construct refers to a perception as it describes the individually per-
ceived risk in a specific situation. Moreover, we conceptualise privacy risks as a multi-dimensional 
construct that applies to the entity of individuals. It is not intended to measure the privacy risks of 
groups or organisations as these parties likely face different risk dimensions than the ones individuals 
face. Based on the work of Karwatzki et al. (2017), we conceptualise privacy risks to comprise the 
dimensions physical, social, resource-related, psychological, prosecution-related, freedom-related, and 
career-related risks. Table 1 depicts the definitions of each dimension, which we extend to cover risk 
in its entirety. We therefore include the second component of risk, which is the probability of occur-
rence. These privacy risk dimensions form the basis for our scale development. 
Regarding the stability of our construct, we expect it to be varying across individuals and situations. In 
contrast to constructs such as general privacy dispositions (Li, 2014), privacy risks are an individual’s 
perception of the extent to which negative outcomes may arise out of a specific situation in which oth-
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ers may gain access to an individual’s information. Thus, we expect privacy risks to naturally differ 
between individuals and contexts which may depend on, for example, individual characteristics such 
as privacy dispositions and previous experiences, and situation-specific characteristics such as which 
information may be shared with whom. Defining privacy risks as a multi-dimensional construct can be 
useful to analyse these contextual differences in depth. 
 
Dimension Definition 
Extent to which an individual believes that… 
Physical risk … a loss of physical safety may arise from access to the individual’s information. 
Social risk … a change in one’s social status may arise from access to the individual’s infor-mation. 
Resource-related risk … a loss of resources may arise from access to the individual’s information. 
Psychological risk … a negative impact on one’s peace of mind may arise from access to the individu-al’s information. 
Prosecution-related 
risk 
… legal actions that are taken against an individual may arise from access to the indi-
vidual’s information. 
Career-related risk … negative impacts on one’s career may arise from access to the individual’s infor-mation. 
Freedom-related risk … a loss of freedom of opinion and behavior may arise from access to the individu-al’s information. 
Table 1.  Dimensions of Privacy Risks 
3.2 Step 2: Development of Measures 
To develop measures, two steps are necessary. First, potential items have to be generated. Second, the 
content validity of those items must be assessed to ensure their suitability. 
3.2.1 Item Generation 
For item generation, we relied on existing risk scales (Stone and Grønhaug, 1993; Featherman and 
Pavlou, 2003; Krasnova et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2010) that were developed for other contexts wherever 
possible. As the work by Karwatzki et al. (2017) formed the basis for the conceptualisation of our sev-
en risk dimensions, we also relied on their qualitative data set which consists of twenty-two focus 
groups with 119 participants (see Karwatzki et al. (2017) for more details) to generate suitable items. 
We particularly drew on the expressions that the focus group participants used in the discussions. 
Overall, we came up with 70 items that can be allocated to the seven dimensions as displayed in Table 
2. We paid special attention to dimensions which were newly developed, which largely differ from 
existing risk conceptualisations, or for which several subdimensions were identified by Karwatzki et 
al. (2017). We developed a variety of items to test which of those best capture the nature of the con-
struct. 
 
Dimension Number of Items Dimension Number of Items 
Physical risk 9 items Prosecution-related risk 10 items 
Social risk 12 items Career-related risks 11 items 
Resource-related risk 9 items Freedom-related risk 9 items 
Psychological risk 10 items   
Table 2.  Initial Set of Items for Each Risk Dimension 
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3.2.2 Assessment of Content Validity 
We conducted two steps to assess the content validity. First of all, we did an open sorting with ten 
raters based on the guidelines of Moore and Benbasat (1991). The raters got index cards where each 
item was printed on one card. They were instructed to categorize the items and to label and explain the 
identified groups. For this task, the raters were not provided with any names or definitions of the un-
derlying constructs. Having sorted the items, we also discussed the identified categories with the raters 
in detail to gain a deeper understanding of the problems they encountered during the sorting process as 
well as any difficulties they had with the wording or comprehensibility of the items. Based on their 
feedback, we dropped some items and slightly adjusted some other items. Next, we provided twenty 
raters with the definitions of the constructs and asked them to rate the extent to which the refined items 
belong to each construct domain using a five-point Likert scale. In order to reduce the complexity of 
this task, we only presented half of our item set to each rater, as they otherwise would be overwhelmed 
by this huge number of items. Based on these item ratings, we were able to assess the items’ content 
adequacy (MacKenzie et al., 2011). To do so, we conducted a one-way repeated measures analysis of 
variance for each of the items to investigate whether the item’s mean rating on one risk dimension sig-
nificantly differs from the item’s mean ratings on other risk dimensions. Our results show that our 
raters associated the majority of items with their intended dimensions, yet some items were also asso-
ciated with more than one dimension. We used the results to slightly adjust the wording of some items 
and then repeated the rating task to assess the content validity of all adapted and newly added items. 
3.3 Step 3: Model Specification 
Based on our conceptualisation, we model privacy risk as a seven-dimensional construct: physical, 
prosecution-related, social, career-related, resource-related, freedom-related, and psychological risk. 
We measure all risk dimensions reflectively while the dimensions influence overall privacy risk. We 
used the rules provided by Jarvis et al. (2003) for this decision: The indicators of every first-order con-
struct are manifestations of the construct, they share a common theme and can be used interchangea-
bly, and covariate. Thus, we have a reflective model for our risk dimensions. However, since those 
constructs are conceptually different and cover separate aspects of the overall privacy risk construct, 
they cannot be interchanged and do not necessarily covary with each other, so that each of them 
should have an impact on overall risk. These considerations indicate that we have a formative second-
order construct. In sum, we model privacy risks as a reflective first-order, formative-second order con-
struct. 
3.4 Step 4: Scale Evaluation and Refinement 
To get a first assessment of the proposed scales, we conducted a small pre-study to investigate the re-
flective first-order constructs. The pre-study was conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
A total of 61 completed questionnaires were received. The purpose of this pre-study was (1) to test the 
comprehensibility of the items and of different alternative scenarios that we planned to use in the main 
study, (2) to do preliminary reliability and validity assessments, and (3) to shorten our instrument so 
that we had between four to six items per construct. We also included an open text field which allowed 
the participants to comment on the scenario and on the items as well as on their overall experiences 
with the questionnaire.  
We assessed reliability and validity by doing an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (settings: principal 
component analysis, Oblimin rotation) in SPSS (version 24) which showed that all first-order con-
structs are unidimensional as intended. However, when conducting an EFA with career-related and 
prosecution-related risk items, a few items had high loadings on both identified factors so that we in-
vestigated them in more detail. We also evaluated Cronbach’s alpha. For all constructs, the value was 
above the commonly suggested threshold of 0.7 (even above 0.85). Moreover, we looked at the values 
for Cronbach’s alpha if deleted to identify candidates for elimination and considered the comments in 
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the open text field to carefully reword our items if necessary. Table 3 gives an overview of the final 
item set.  
Dimension ID Item 
  If someone has access to the information this app has about me... 
Physical 
risk 
 
PH1 ... my physical safety might be impacted. 
PH2 ... I might be exposed to physical threats. 
PH3 ... the chance of me being physically harmed is increased. 
PH4 ... it might endanger my physical safety. 
PH5 ... my physical safety might be at risk. 
Social risk 
 
SO1 ... it might damage my reputation. 
SO2 ... it might impact the perception that others have of me. 
SO3 ... it might change the way people think about me. 
SO4 ... my social status might be influenced. 
SO5 ... my peer group might think differently of me. 
Resource-
related risk 
 
RR1 ... it might consume my time or my money. 
RR2 ... it might cost me time or money. 
RR3 ... it might require efforts or expenditures. 
RR4 ... it might cause efforts or financial disadvantages. 
RR5 ... it might affect my resources (e.g. time, money) negatively. 
Psycholog-
ical risk 
PS1 ... I might feel uncomfortable. 
PS2 ... it might give me a feeling of anxiety. 
PS3 ... it might cause inner restlessness. 
PS4 ... I might experience mental tension. 
PS5 ... it might burden me mentally. 
Prosecu-
tion-
related risk 
PR1 ... I might get judicially indictable, either wrongly or rightfully. 
PR2 ... I might be prosecuted due to wrongful or rightful suspicions. 
PR3 ... I might be sued because of wrongly or rightfully made accusations. 
PR4 ... I might be held legally accountable due to wrongful or rightful suspicions. 
PR5 ... I might be held responsible due to wrongful or rightful suspicions. 
Career-
related 
risks 
 
CR1 ... it might reduce my career prospects. 
CR2 ... it might affect my career negatively. 
CR3 ... it might make it difficult to be successful in my job. 
CR4 ... it might result in a negative shift in my career. 
CR5 ... it might result in a stagnation of my career development. 
Freedom-
related risk 
FR1 ... my opinion or behaviour might get manipulated. 
FR2 ... it might influence my decision making. 
FR3 ... my thoughts or actions might be influenced externally. 
FR4 ... my mindset or my resulting behaviour might get influenced. 
FR5 ... my attitude or behaviour might get influenced. 
Table 3.  Privacy Risk Constructs with their Final Items 
3.5 Step 5: Validation  
The last step of our scale development process aimed at assessing the developed scales in a larger-
scale survey. Moreover, we wanted to investigate privacy risks in a nomological network.  
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Such a nomological network should include other constructs that are expected to serve as antecedents 
and consequences of the focal construct which ideally has been shown in previous research (MacKen-
zie et al., 2011). We followed this recommendation and used a privacy calculus perspective which has 
been extensively applied in multiple studies (e.g., see Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Dinev et al., 2006; 
Dinev and Hart, 2006; Hann et al., 2007; Kehr et al., 2015; Krasnova et al., 2010; Sarathy and Li, 
2007). The privacy calculus perspective assumes that individuals perform a risk-benefit analysis when 
having to decide on whether and how much personal information to provide to other parties (Culnan 
and Bies, 2003; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Smith et al., 2011). We therefore deem it a suitable model for 
our purposes and apply it to validate our privacy risk measurement instrument. In line with prior pri-
vacy research (Bélanger and Crossler, 2011; Smith et al., 2011), we decided to use intention to use an 
app and willingness to provide information to an app as dependent variables in our nomological net-
work. Regarding predictors of privacy risk, we leverage the construct privacy experiences. It is a wide-
ly used antecedent of privacy-related constructs and refers to an individual’s prior negative experienc-
es due to being exposed to or having fallen victim to information abuse (Smith et al., 1996; Li, 2014). 
We expect privacy experiences to have a positive influence on our privacy risk construct. We further 
expand our nomological network by another commonly used antecedent of privacy constructs, namely 
individuals’ familiarity with the service type (Li, 2014), which we expect to be negatively related to 
our privacy risk construct. The measures for the additional variables in the nomological network are 
depicted in Table 6 in the Appendix. The general model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Familiarity
Privacy
experience
Privacy risks
Usage intention
Physical risks
Social
risks
Resource- re-
lated risks
Psychological
risks
Prosecution-
related risks
Career-
related risks
Freedom-
related risks
-
+
-
Willingness
to provide
information
-
+
+
 
Figure 2.  Nomological Network of Validation Study 
To test our nomological network, we place our study exemplarily in the context of a health app. We 
developed a questionnaire that introduced a novel app to participants that requires them to share sensi-
tive information. To make this as realistic as possible, we told all participants that the study was done 
in cooperation with a start-up that wants to gain market insights before launching their product shortly. 
The health app would provide interesting insights into one’s own well-being and provide suggestions 
for improvement. In order to do that, it requires sensitive data such as continuous GPS tracking, nutri-
tional information, and sleep tracking. The app also offers the possibility to share health-related data 
with insurances or social peers. After introducing the service, we then asked for their assessment. First 
of all, we asked individuals about their general willingness to share data with this service and their 
intention to use it, once it is released. The participants then had to assess their perceptions of the risks 
and benefits of the service. The risk dimensions were measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items of all risk dimensions were merged in this section 
and the appearance of the individual items was fully randomized in order to prevent click-throughs or 
order effects. Establishing reliability and validity using fully randomized items would be a tough test 
for our conceptualisation and for the developed scales. We then asked the other questions from our 
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nomological network, a marker variable and finally closed the survey with demographic details and a 
debriefing. 
We recruited 128 participants from MTurk who participated in our survey. MTurk is a well-
established platform for behavioural research and experiments (Behrend et al., 2011). A variety of 
studies have demonstrated high reliability and quality of data and results derived from respondents on 
MTurk (e.g., Behrend et al., 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Steelman et al., 2014). In addition, MTurk 
is a suitable platform to reach users familiar with the internet and digital technologies, who are poten-
tial adopters of innovative digital services such as the health app in our study. We restricted participa-
tion to users with a high reputation (at least 98% approval rate and at least 500 conducted tasks), 
which is a sufficient measure to ensure high data quality (Peer et al., 2014). Participants were between 
20 and 74 years old with a mean age of 39.4 years and a standard deviation of 11.8. 53.9% percent of 
the participants were female. Around a third of the participants indicated a yearly household income 
below $35,000 (32.8%). 43% between indicated an income between $35,000 and $75,000 and the re-
maining 24.2% have more than $75,000 per year at their disposal. Thus, our sample represents a cross-
section of the population without being biased towards young people, a particular gender, or an in-
come group. 
We first wanted to make sure that our seven dimensions of privacy risks in fact appear in a factor 
analysis and that there is no major overlap between the dimensions (although of course all dimensions 
refer to privacy risks, so they should not be fully orthogonal). We thus ran principal component analy-
sis using Oblimin rotation with Kaiser Normalization (see Hair et al., 2014). The pattern matrix re-
veals the expected seven factors. It shows unique loadings of each item linked to its respective factor. 
The structure matrix shows correlations of more than 0.7 for the expected relationships between fac-
tors and items (most are even above 0.9) and well below 0.7 (most are below 0.6) with factors that 
should not be linked to the respective risk dimensions. These results indicate that there are no prob-
lematic unintended cross loadings. We also investigated Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of 
our constructs. All constructs have values above 0.9, thus they are well above the recommended 
threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). All details on descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4. 
We used partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM using SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle et 
al., 2015)) to examine our research model. Arguments can be made in favour and against the use of 
PLS-SEM in comparison to covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) (Goodhue et 
al., 2006, 2012; Marcoulides et al., 2012). Both approaches differ in their underlying philosophy and 
estimation objectives (Gefen et al., 2011). While CB-SEM emphasizes how well the proposed research 
model accounts for measurement item co-variances, thereby offering various indices how well param-
eter estimates match sample co-variances (Chin, 1998), PLS-SEM uses the empirical data for estimat-
ing relationships with the aim to maximize the explained variance in the endogenous latent variable 
(Hair et al., 2014). Given the early stage of this investigation, the exploratory character of the study 
and the primary interest in identifying potential relationships between variables, we decided to use 
PLS-SEM for evaluating the drivers of actual information disclosure behaviour. However, consistent 
empirical results are expected when using CB-SEM. 
When modelling our nomological network in SmartPLS, we followed the recommendations of Hair et 
al. (2018) and applied a repeated indicators approach to model our first-order reflective, second-order 
formative privacy risk construct. This decision has several implications for our analysis, which will be 
discussed in due course. To assess the measurement model, we first investigated the standardized fac-
tor loadings (see Table 4). For reflective constructs to be reliable, composite reliability (CR) and 
Cronbach’s alpha (Alpha) both have to be above 0.7 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Nunnally and Bern-
stein, 1994) which is the case for all of our constructs (see Table 4). To ensure validity at the construct 
level, average variance extracted (AVE) has to be above 0.5 which means that the latent construct ac-
counts for the majority of the variance of its indicators (MacKenzie et al., 2011). In our sample, AVE 
even exceeds 0.7 for all risk constructs (see Table 5). We also assessed discriminant validity by using 
the Fornell-Larcker criterion which says that discriminant validity is sufficient if the square root of  
 
Karwatzki et al. /Measuring Privacy Risks 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 10 
 
Con-
struct 
Cr.α / 
CR 
Item 
ID 
Fact. 
Load. 
Mean STD Construct Cr.α / 
CR 
Item 
ID 
Fact.
Load. 
Mean STD 
Physical 
risk (PH) 
0.98 / 
0.98 
PH1 
PH2 
PH3 
PH4 
PH5 
0.97 
0.95 
0.96 
0.94 
0.95 
3.70 
3.48 
3.59 
3.55 
3.66 
2.00 
2.01 
2.00 
2.00 
2.05 
Freedom-
related 
risk (FR) 
0.92 / 
0.94 
FR1 
FR2 
FR3 
FR4 
FR5 
0.83 
0.87 
0.88 
0.86 
0.92 
4.21 
4.56 
4.39 
4.41 
4.30 
1.83 
1.75 
1.77 
1.87 
1.81 
Social 
risk (SO) 
0.94 / 
0.95 
SO1 
SO2 
SO3 
SO4 
SO5 
0.88 
0.91 
0.91 
0.89 
0.88 
3.63 
4.05 
3.90 
3.63 
3.51 
1.87 
1.88 
1.90 
1.88 
1.97 
Benefits 
(BE) 
0.92 / 
0.95 
BE1 
BE2 
BE3 
0.97 
0.96 
0.87 
 
4.56 
4.63 
4.45 
1.58 
1.61 
1.79 
 
Re-
source-
related 
risk (RR) 
0.93 / 
0.95 
RR1 
RR2 
RR3 
RR4 
RR5 
0.88 
0.93 
0.81 
0.89 
0.90 
4.79 
4.84 
4.62 
4.51 
4.52 
1.70 
1.75 
1.73 
1.86 
1.87 
Famili-
arity 
(FA) 
0.92 / 
0.95 
FA1 
FA2 
FA3 
0.93 
0.95 
0.92 
4.38 
4.44 
4.42 
1.64 
1.64 
1.69 
Psycho-
logical 
risk (PS) 
0.94 / 
0.95 
PS1 
PS2 
PS3 
PS4 
PS5 
0.85 
0.92 
0.91 
0.91 
0.90 
5.81 
5.37 
5.23 
5.22 
5.20 
1.39 
1.60 
1.69 
1.58 
1.55 
Prior 
negative 
privacy 
experi-
ence (PP) 
0.96 / 
0.97 
PP1 
PP2 
PP3 
PP4 
0.95 
0.97 
0.96 
0.87 
3.43 
3.61 
3.64 
3.55 
1.93 
2.10 
2.05 
1.98 
Prosecu-
tion-
related 
risk (PR) 
0.96 / 
0.97 
PR1 
PR2 
PR3 
PR4 
PR5 
0.89 
0.95 
0.93 
0.95 
0.92 
3.24 
3.21 
2.92 
3.30 
3.29 
1.94 
2.00 
2.01 
2.01 
1.91 
Intention 
to pro-
vide in-
formation 
(IP) 
0.97 / 
0.98 
IP1 
IP2 
IP3 
0.98 
0.98 
0.94 
4.00 
4.09 
3.95 
1.97 
2.08 
2.07 
Career-
related 
risk (CR) 
0.97 / 
0.98 
CR1 
CR2 
CR3 
CR4 
CR5 
0.96 
0.96 
0.92 
0.96 
0.96 
3.02 
3.19 
2.98 
2.96 
2.93 
1.84 
1.87 
1.84 
1.77 
1.79 
Usage 
intention 
(UI) 
0.95 / 
0.97 
UI1 
UI2 
UI3 
0.97 
0.93 
0.97 
3.81 
4.71 
3.88 
1.72 
1.87 
1.89 
Table 4.  Measurement Model Results 
AVE is larger than the correlations of the construct with any other construct (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). Table 5 depicts that we have an adequate level of discriminant validity. 
To assess the measurement model of our second-order privacy risk construct, we needed to assess the 
weights between the first-order risk dimensions and overall privacy risk, which is depicted as path co-
efficients in the PLS-SEM analysis (Hair et al., 2018). The analysis shows that all risk dimensions sig-
nificantly influence the second-order construct and that the effects are of similar size (physical risks: 
β = 0.21, p < 0.001; social risks: β = 0.18, p < 0.001; resource-related risks: β = 0.17, p < 0.001; psy-
chological risks: β = 0.17, p < 0.001; prosecution-related risks: β = 0.18, p < 0.001; career-related 
risks: β = 0.21, p < 0.001; freedom-related risks: β = 0.17, p < 0.001). Discriminant validity, however, 
is not of concern. The modelling of the second-order construct via a repeated indicators approach leads 
to conceptual and empirical redundancy, so that an assessment of discriminant validity between the 
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 BE CR FA FR IP PH PP PR PS RR SO UI 
Benefits (BE) 0.93            
Career-r. risk (CR) -0.19 0.95           
Familiarity (FA) 0.12 -0.04 0.93          
Freedom-r. risk (FR) -0.01 0.49 -0.09 0.87         
Int. provide info. (IP) 0.60 -0.14 0.26 -0.16 0.97        
Physical risk (PH) -0.22 0.56 -0.09 0.50 -0.26 0.96       
Privacy exp. (PP) 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.25 -0.22 0.30 0.94      
Prosec. risk (PR) 0.01 0.67 -0.18 0.56 -0.03 0.58 0.18 0.93     
Psychol. risk (PS) -0.05 0.39 -0.09 0.69 -0.17 0.50 0.30 0.38 0.87    
Resource-r. risk (RR) -0.15 0.59 -0.07 0.56 -0.20 0.41 0.37 0.56 0.56 0.88   
Social risk (SO) -0.11 0.74 -0.02 0.55 -0.10 0.49 0.20 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.89  
Usage int. (UI) 0.71 -0.22 0.17 -0.17 0.68 -0.21 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 0.95 
Note: The diagonal elements (in bold) represent the square root of AVE 
Table 5.  Correlation Matrix and AVE 
first-order constructs and the second-order construct is meaningless (Hair et al., 2018). Yet, potential 
collinearity between the first-order risk constructs needs to be assessed. As the variance inflation fac-
tors (VIF) of all risk dimensions are well below the threshold of 5 (physical risks: VIF = 1.94; social 
risks: VIF = 2.95; resource-related risks: VIF = 2.24; psychological risks: VIF = 2.67; prosecution-
related risks: VIF = 2.44; career-related risks: VIF = 3.48; freedom-related risks: VIF = 2.42), colline-
arity is not an issue (Hair et al., 2014).  
The results of the analysis of our nomological model are depicted in Figure 3. We find a negative im-
pact of privacy risks (β = -0.13, p<0.05) on usage intention for the service after controlling for the in-
fluence of benefits (β = 0.67, p<0.001). The same holds for the willingness to provide information to 
the service (β = -0.12, p<0.05), the second variable that we expected to be influenced by privacy risks. 
Data provision is also strongly depended on the benefits that can be derived from the service (β = 0.58, 
p<0.001). We also find significant influences of familiarity (β = -0.14, p<0.1) and prior privacy expe-
riences (β = 0.35, p<0.001) on privacy risks as expected. Lastly, we controlled for demographics such 
as age, gender, and income. The analysis resulted in only one significant relationship: women seem to 
be more eager to use the service we described (β = 0.15, p<0.01). 
Familiarity
Privacy
experience
Privacy risks
Usage intention
Physical risks
Social
risks
Resource- re-
lated risks
Psychological
risks
Prosecution-
related risks
Career-
related risks
Freedom-
related risks
-0.14+
Willingness
to provide
information
+ p<0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
0.35***
0.17***
0.18***
0.17***
0.17***
0.18***
0.21***
0.17***
0.58***
0.67***
-0.13*
-0.12*
Figure 3.  PLS Structural Results 
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Overall, the research model explains 52.3% of usage intention, and 36.1% of the intention to provide 
data. As we found support for all hypothesized relationships between our focal construct privacy risks 
and its antecedents and outcome, we can conclude that nomological validity is given. 
4 Discussion  
The objective of our study was twofold. First, we aimed at systematically developing and validating 
scales for privacy risks as multi-dimensional concept. Second, we wanted to do a first empirical as-
sessment of how privacy risks influence individuals’ information disclosure and usage intentions. Our 
results show that we developed suitable scales which offer promising avenues for a further exploration 
of how privacy perceptions influence individuals’ behaviour and thus provide several interesting con-
tributions to theory and practice. 
To systematically develop scales for privacy risks, we build our work on the dimensions of privacy 
risks identified Karwatzki et al. (2017) in a large qualitative study. We conceptualised privacy risks as 
a multi-dimensional construct comprising the risk dimensions of social, psychological, physical, pros-
ecution-related, freedom-related, career-related, and resource-related risks. We thereby contribute to 
theory a conceptualisation of privacy risks that describes the extent to which individuals perceive to be 
affected by a privacy invasion through third parties and specifies the types of impact that may occur. 
By providing a reliable and valid measurement instrument that captures this multi-dimensional con-
ceptualisation, we offer a novel perspective on how to measure privacy-related perceptions. Previous 
conceptualisations neglected to capture which negative consequences can arise for individuals when 
they share information online and how individuals perceive those negative consequences to impact 
them (e.g., see Dinev et al., 2006; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Hong and Thong, 2013; Malhotra et al., 
2004; Smith et al., 1996). Second, we demonstrated the usefulness of our measurement instrument. 
We used a nomological network to validate our measurement instrument and found support for all hy-
pothesized relationships. The results of our analysis show that our construct exhibits discriminant and 
nomological validity. Our scale thus captures the complex multi-dimensional nature of privacy risks 
and thus supplements existing measurement instruments.  
Our study has also practical implications. Many business models such as those of innovative apps de-
pend on fast growth rates and on the collection and analysis of user data. Therefore, those service pro-
viders are very interested in better understanding the circumstances of individual information disclo-
sure, reasons that might prevent disclosure, and how to mitigate problematic influences. By providing 
a conceptualisation of privacy risks as a multi-dimensional construct and by showing its influence on 
usage and information disclosure intention, we provide organisations with opportunities to better un-
derstand why consumers might hesitate to share information in certain situations and which risks may 
have to be mitigated by the service design in order to prevent discouraged users. 
We see several promising avenues for future research. While we investigated privacy risks in the con-
text of an innovative health app, in our future research we will explore the influence of privacy risks in 
other contexts as well, for example in social networking, in e-commerce, personalized newspapers, or 
in a digital job market with artificial intelligence. Thereby, we could obtain a more fine-grained under-
standing of how privacy risks are influencing user behaviour in different contexts. With the help of 
experimental setups, we could explore situation-specific differences in individuals’ risk assessments. 
The multi-dimensional construct of privacy risks also opens up new research opportunities on how 
third parties can actively mitigate privacy risks. In doing so, we believe it is on the one hand especially 
interesting to evaluate the effect of existing mitigation mechanisms such as seals, privacy policies, or 
building up trust and long-term relationships on the single dimensions of privacy risk to understand 
how and to which extent they work in different contexts. On the other hand, we need to design new 
mechanisms that effectively mitigate risks. This is also of high practical relevance, as organisations are 
interested in changing online users’ privacy risks to better align their information disclosure behav-
iours with their aims. 
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5 Conclusion  
In today’s digital and data-driven economy, many individuals are concerned about their information 
privacy. We offer a conceptualisation of privacy risks that incorporates the extent to which individuals 
perceive negative consequences to occur if third parties invade their privacy. This is a novel and prom-
ising perspective to measure the impact of privacy since previous conceptualisations of privacy con-
cerns and privacy risks have not included this component of concrete consequences. We identified 
seven dimensions of privacy risks, namely physical, social, resource-related, psychological, prosecu-
tion-related, career-related, and freedom-related risks and thoroughly developed and empirically vali-
dated scales to assess them. Moreover, we demonstrated that privacy risks are a useful predictor of 
individuals’ information disclosure and usage intention. Our research thus provides researchers and 
practitioners with new avenues for investigating the influence of privacy risks on individuals’ online 
behaviour.  
Appendix 
Dimension ID Item 
Benefits BE1 I would benefit from using [this app]. 
BE2 It would be advantageous for me to use [this app] with all its functions. 
BE3 [This app] offers functions I would profit from. 
Familiarity FA1 I know pretty much about apps like this. 
FA2 Compared to most other people, I know less about apps like this. (re-
versed) 
FA3 I feel familiar with apps like this. 
Prior negative privacy 
experience 
PP1 I have had bad experiences with regard to my online privacy before. 
PP2 I was a victim of what I felt was an invasion of my privacy. 
PP3 I believe that my online privacy was invaded by other people or organisa-
tions. 
PP4 I experienced my personal information being misused by companies 
without my authorization. 
Intention to provide 
information 
In order to use this service, I would be willing to share the required personal infor-
mation 
IP1 Very unlikely/Very likely 
IP2 Not probable/Probable  
IP3 Willingly/Unwillingly (reversed) 
Usage intention UI1 I intend to use [this app] in future. 
UI2 I could imagine using [this app] in future. 
UI3 I predict that I would use [this app] in future. 
Table 6.  Items for Nomological Network 
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